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Introduction
Philosophers from antiquity onwards have asked whether we are
harmed by death itself [1,2]. My question is different. I want to
know whether we can be harmed by further events that happen
after we are dead. While connected, the two questions are clearly
distinct. Someone might think that death is normally a very bad
thing for the deceased, yet hold that, once you are gone, you are
beyond the reach of any further harms.
This is not my view. I shall be arguing that, even after we are
dead, we can be further harmed by subsequent events. This is not
because I think that we somehow survive our deaths. I am quite
convinced that once we are dead, we cease to exist in any sense.
But even so I hold that events subsequent to our death can harm us.
What happens after we are gone can make a genuine difference to
our good or bad fortune.
Note how my question has practical implications that are not
raised by the more familiar question about death itself. On my
view, we can well have reason to influence posthumous events so
as to benefit the dead. For those who deny that people can be
harmed after they are dead, their interests will cease to matter to
others once they are gone. I disagree. I think that we can have
reason to protect the interests of dead people.
Two examples
Let us consider a couple of hypothetical examples.
Jane is a single woman of independent means. She has devoted
the last 10 years to a book on the flora of West Sussex. When she
dies suddenly and unexpectedly, the book is complete but some-
what disordered. A publisher is lined up, but there is still work to
be done in tidying up the typescript, dispatching it to the publisher,
and so forth. You are a distant relative, and it falls to you to decide
whether to arrange publication or simply to throw the work away.
John is also single, and once more you are a distant relative
sorting out his effects after he dies suddenly and unexpectedly.You
discover evidence, in the form of clothes and diaries and so on, that
he was a secret cross-dresser. This is a surprise to you since John
was a highly respectable solicitor, who played a prominent and
beneficial role in local affairs and took pride in his reputation as a
model of probity. If you do not destroy the evidence, the story will
certainly get out and be made a fuss of in the local press.
To focus the issue, let me specify that in neither case will it
make any significant difference to anybody alive whether the book
is published or the cross-dressing kept a secret. Neither Jane nor
John has any close friends or family who will feel personally
pleased or distressed by what happens. Jane’s book is worthy
enough, and will recover the publisher its costs, but there are other
books with similar remits, and the information in it is already
available in the journals for any serious scholars to find. Similarly,
nothing of public moment will hinge on whether John’s cross-
dressing is kept secret or not.
Indeed, we may as well specify that, as far as the public good
goes, it will be marginally better if Jane’s book is not published
(the resources it requires could be used for better purposes) and
John’s cross-dressing is made public (it will help people under-
stand that such harmless compulsions can coexist with general
goodness).
The point is that, insofar as anything bad happens when Jane’s
book is thrown away or John’s secret is exposed, it will be bad for
the dead people, and not for anybody else. Jane is the only person
to whom the publication of the book matters; she is the one who
spent 10 years directed towards this end. Similarly, it is only John
who will be harmed by his secret being exposed; it was he who
strove to build a respectable reputation by hiding his inclinations
and wanted to be remembered in this way.
Harming the dead
Even so, it seems clear to me that in both cases, you would have
reason to do what your deceased relatives would have wished.
Even though the only people to whom it matters are dead, you
Toppan Best-set Premedia Limited
Journal Code: JEP Proofreader: Mony
Article No: JEP1924 Delivery date: 13 Aug 2012
Page Extent: 4
JEP1924
Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice ISSN 1365-2753
© 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd, Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 18 (2012) 1091–1094 1091
1
bs_bs_query
have reason to get Jane’s book published and to preserve John’s
reputation.
Of course, these reasons may not be compelling. I have already
specified that, as far as the general good goes, it would be mar-
ginally better to ignore the deceased’s wishes. And carrying out
these wishes would involve some personal inconvenience to you: it
will take some time and trouble to get the typescript to the pub-
lisher or destroy the evidence. When all these things are taken into
account, you may well rightly conclude that the best thing, all
things considered, is to disregard the concerns of the dead.
Even so, I say, you do have some reason to get the book pub-
lished and to destroy the evidence. These reasons may be out-
weighed by considerations on the other side, but they deserve to be
taken into account.
And this then shows, I argue, that the dead can be harmed by
what happens after they are dead. For what other reason is there for
getting the book published and destroying the evidence, apart from
the fact that failing to perform these actions would harm the dead?
I have taken care to specify that no one alive benefits from these
actions – indeed I have specified that the living will be positively
better off without the publication of the book or destruction of the
evidence. So the only people whose interests can possibly weigh
on the side of these actions are the dead people.
Hedonic and intrinsic facts
You might find it strange to suppose that the dead can be harmed.
But there is no good reason for this suspicion. It is true that some
philosophical theories of harm imply that the dead cannot be
harmed. For example, if harm or benefit were always a matter of
suffering pain or enjoying pleasure, or more generally of having
positive or negative experiences [3], then of course it would be
impossible for the dead to be harmed by things that happen after
their death. You only have experiences when you are alive, and
those experiences cannot be affected by posthumous events.
But this hedonist view of harm and benefit is quite unconvinc-
ing. Am I not harmed by my wife and my most trusted friend
conducting a clandestine affair, even if I never get to know
about it?
To drive the point home, consider Robert Nozick’s ‘experience
machine’ [4]. Suppose you are offered the chance to spend the rest
of your life in a machine, which will generate all the pleasurable
experiences you will ever actually have and more. Would you
rather live out your life in this machine or in the real world? It
seems to most people that life in the real world is clearly more
worthwhile, even though the machine beats it on the count of
pleasurable experiences alone.
A somewhat weaker idea than hedonism is the thesis that harm
or benefit must always involve some modification of people’s
intrinsic properties, even if not of their conscious experiences.
Intrinsic properties are those whose possession by some entity
does not depend constitutively on facts involving other entities: so
my being 6 ft tall is one of my intrinsic properties because it
depends on facts about me alone, but my being the tallest person in
the room is not because this also depends on who else is in the
room and how tall they are.
If harm and benefit always did require some modification of
intrinsic properties, then again it would be impossible for the dead
to be harmed by things that happen after their death. Given that we
cease to exist once we are dead, our intrinsic properties cannot be
causally influenced by events that occur only after we are dead.
But the view that harm and benefit must always involve some
intrinsic change is no more convincing than hedonism itself.
Indeed, the examples that refute hedonism also refute the weaker
claim. When my wife and friend start deceiving me, or when the
experience machine replaces the normal causes of my pleasurable
experiences, I am quite unaltered intrinsically. The modifications
that harm me involve my relations to the wider world, and not any
of my intrinsic properties.
At first pass, it might seem that the possibility of posthumous
harm must involve some kind of ‘backwards causation’, with
future events reaching back in time to produce effects before
death. But the fact that harm can be a matter of relational proper-
ties allays this worry. In the cases at hand, the harm depends on
your relational properties, not your intrinsic properties, and these
relational properties depend crucially on what happens after your
death. Is your book published? Is your cross-dressing kept secret?
It is scarcely surprising that such relational properties are affected
by posthumous events.
Desires and harm
The last section showed that once we recognize that benefit and
harm can be relational, we can dismiss certain arguments against
the possibility of posthumous harm. But what about arguments for
posthumous harm? Given the contentious nature of the suggestion,
it would be good to offer some positive reasons in its favour.
If we could assume a preferentialist desire-based theory of
benefit and harm, then there would be an immediate argument in
favour of posthumous harm. On such a desire-based theory, people
are benefited whenever their desires are satisfied and harmed when
they are not. Since people can clearly have desires about events
after their death, benefit and harm can then hinge on posthumous
events. Jane desired strongly that her book be published, even if
she would no longer be alive to see it, and John similarly desired
that his respectable reputation be preserved after his demise. If any
non-satisfaction of desires occasioned harm, then Jane and John
would be harmed by the frustration of their future-orientated
desires, even if they would not themselves be alive at the time. (Do
not confuse the question of whether their desires are satisfied – that
is, whether the ends at which their desires are directed actually
occur – with the psychological question of whether they experi-
ence any subjective satisfaction as a result. While Jane and John
clearly cannot be subjectively affected by the posthumous success
of their plans, this does not mean that such success was not
precisely what their desires were aimed at.)
However, there are powerful arguments against a desire-based
theory of benefit and harm [5,6]. Suppose I am an addict and find
myself with an overwhelming desire to take a drug even though I
know full well, I will get no subsequent pleasure from its inges-
tion. In what sense am I benefited by consuming it, just because
my prior desire was directed towards this end? It does not look as
if this satisfaction of my desire brings any good to me. Or, again,
suppose I find that I have acquired a pressing desire to count the
blades of grass on my lawn. This fact alone does not show that it
will benefit me to achieve this end. Such a silly desire is surely
better left unsatisfied.
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A desire satisfaction account of benefit and harm seems to get
things the wrong way round. In general, we desire things because
we judge independently that they would contribute to our welfare.
But, on the desire-based account, what makes things contribute to
our welfare is simply that we desire them. To get things right, it
looks as if we need to move beyond a desire-based account and
recognize that certain outcomes are objectively valuable for
agents, whether or not they desire them. Of course, one thing that
can make outcomes valuable for agents is that they will enjoy
them. The arguments against hedonism show that psychological
enjoyment is not the only outcome that is valuable for agents, but
it is certainly one kind of valuable outcome; it would be a grey
world with no enjoyment. Still, even in these cases, the outcome is
not valuable just because it is desired ex ante, but because it will in
fact later give enjoyment. Being desired beforehand is one thing,
and giving enjoyment later is another, as the case of the drug addict
shows.
So we cannot establish the possibility of posthumous harm
simply by pointing out that the dead often had strong desires about
events after their death. You are not necessarily harmed by the
non-satisfaction of your desires. It depends on whether the object
of your desire is objectively valuable, independently of whether
you desired it.
Agent-relative value
This last point might now seem to raise a problem. I say that
benefit and harm must involve results that are objectively valuable.
But in what sense can results that matter only to certain specific
individuals be objectively valuable? When I set up my examples, I
took care to specify that the outcomes did not further the public
good. This was because I wanted to make sure it was the dead that
would be harmed or benefited, not the survivors. I did not want our
judgements that the book should be published or the cross-
dressing kept a secret to be contaminated by the thought that this
would be a good thing for the world in general.
Does not this show that relevant outcomes are not objectively
valuable, and therefore that their non-occurrence cannot be genu-
inely harmful, even to the dead? It looks as if the results are
significant in our examples only because Jane and John desired
them, not because of any genuine worth they may have. And if that
is right, should not they be classed alongside the drug addict’s fix
and the grass counter’s foible, as outcomes that would not be of
any genuine benefit to anybody?
But it would be a mistake to infer, from the fact that an outcome
only matters to some specific person that it must derive from some
pointless desire, and therefore is of no genuine worth. This would
ignore the possibility of agent-relative values. Sometimes, out-
comes are valuable for some people and not for others, yet are
nevertheless objectively value for those people, independently of
whether they desire them. I have already mentioned enjoyment.
The enjoyment I derive from a day’s sailing, say, is genuinely
valuable. It is valuable specifically for me, in a way it is not for
you. Enjoyment is thus an obvious example of something that
matters to genuine benefit and harm, yet does so in an agent-
relative way.
But not all agent-relative values are so hedonistic or egotistic. It
is objectively valuable for me and my wife that our children
flourish, in a way that it is not valuable to the population in general.
A special case of agent-relative values involve the achievement
of projects and ambitions. It is central to human nature that we set
ourselves long-term aspirations, and our success or failure in these
projects are often the most important thing in our lives. Now, it is
true, as with desires, that some projects are so silly that their
achievement is not genuinely worthwhile at all. (A grass-counting
ambition could be a case in point.) Still, once someone does
commit themselves to a project that is not just downright silly, then
this will mean that the successful culmination of the project is
valuable for that person, in a way it would not otherwise have
been. The mere fact that I set myself the aim of running a marathon
in under four hours makes this outcome especially valuable
for me.1
This is what I think about my two examples. Jane and John both
have long-term ambitions, the achievement of which is not
restricted to their lifespan. Neither ambition – getting the book
published, preserving a reputation – is at all silly, even if it will
bring no great benefit to the wider world. As a result, these out-
comes are objectively valuable for them, even though they do not
matter to other people in the same way. This is why they would be
harmed by the prevention of these outcomes. Something that is
genuinely valuable for them would be taken away.
One last point. I said earlier that you, as a distant relative of Jane
or John, would have reason to prevent their being harmed by
posthumous events. But my last points might seem to undermine
that thought. If the threatened outcomes are bad specifically for
them because of their ambitions and projects, but not for you, or
for anyone else alive, then in what sense do you have a reason to
prevent them? The agent-relative value of the outcomes would of
course give Jane and John reason to prevent them, if only they
could. But, precisely because the values are agent relative, they
might seem irrelevant to what you should now do.
However, the fact remains that these outcomes would harm
your dead relatives. The outcomes per se may not matter to you,
but they would mean a failure of the deceased’s ambitions, and
that would harm them significantly. I take it that in general, we
have reason to prevent harm to people. Such reasons may be
overridden, and indeed, I have allowed that in the cases at
hand they may not be compelling. But they are genuine reasons
for all that, that deserve to be taken into account in your
deliberations.
So even though the publication of Jane’s book or the preser-
vation of John’s reputation may not in themselves be of any
value to you, their long-term goals mean that the failure of these
outcomes would harm them. And the prevention of such harm is
of value to you. That is why you have a reason to carry out their
wishes. More generally, given that the dead can be harmed by
events that happen after their death, in the ways I have shown,
we survivors will often have reason to act so as to enhance their
welfare.
This paper was presented on 9 December 2011 at the King’s
College/Centre for Humanities and Health Workshop on Death. A
report on this workshop [2] and three other papers from it [1,8,9]
are also published in this issue.
1
‘. . . once a person has made something his goal it acquires special
importance for him. He has a reason to pursue it that he did not have
before’ [7].
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